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Abstract
Whether voters vote strategically, using their vote to best further their interests, or
vote sincerely, voting for their rst choice among the alternatives, is a question of long-
standing interest. We oer two innovations in searching for the answer to this question.
First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic
systems than has been presented in the literature to date. Second, we incorporate new
operationalizations of the objective potential for strategic behavior than have been used
in the past. We oer a test of strategic voting in the 1987 British General Election based
on the variance in strategic setting across constituencies in Britain. We allow voters to
use available information in deciding whether or not to cast a strategic vote. We esti-
mate a lower level of strategic voting than many other methods have estimated. We also
demonstrate that the use of self-reported vote motivation causes errors in estimating the
amount of strategic voting, and that this problem is exacerbated the further from the
election the self-report is obtained.
A New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting in
Multiparty Elections

R. Michael Alvarez Jonathan Nagler
1 Introduction
Whether voters in democratic systems are \rational" has long been under debate. One
of the central points of contention has been whether the Riker and Ordeshook (1968)
\calculus of voting" is sound empirically (e.g. Green and Shapiro 1994; Aldrich 1993;
Jackman 1993). There, the voter is assumed to calculate the costs and benets of voting
and to vote for the candidate bringing them the highest utility, if the utility of doing so
outweighs the cost of voting.
When the \calculus of voting" model was extended to multiparty elections by McK-
elvey and Ordeshook (1972), though, the theoretical rationale for another form of rational
behavior became quite clear. For the McKelvey and Ordeshook model demonstrated that
in a multiparty election, a voter might be willing to vote for her second most preferred
party if the more preferred party is unlikely to win and if there is a close contest be-
tween the second and third ranked parties. This rational behavior goes by many labels,
called strategic, tactical, or sophisticated voting behavior (we will refer to this behavior
as strategic voting in this paper).
Obviously, this sort of strategic behavior by voters was not noticed rst by McKelvey
and Ordeshook. In fact, there is have been a number of theoretical developments of
models of strategic voting behavior in single-member district plurality systems (Cox
1994, 1997; Myerson and Weber 1993; Palfrey 1989) as well as in many other types of
electoral systems (Cox 1984; Dummett 1984; Gutowski and George 1993; Homan 1982;
Ludwin 1978; Myerson and Weber 1993). But because of the obsession of much of the
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political behavior literature on modeling two{party or two{candidate elections in the
United States, strategic behavior was largely ignored by most researchers until the late
1970's and early 1980's. Two political developments fueled the rising interest in strategic
voting research. One was the rise of multi{candidate presidential primary contests in
the United States following the post{1968 reforms in the nomination processes in both
of the major political parties. In some of these primary struggles, there were at least a
half of a dozen candidates in each party primary; the fact that there were multiple viable
candidates opened the door for strategic behavior by primary voters (Abramson et al.
1992; Bartels 1985).
The second development was the rise of third{party or third{candidate challengers
in the United States and in the United Kingdom (Cain 1978; Galbriath and Rae 1989;
Heath et al. 1991; Johnston and Pattie 1991; Niemi et al. 1992). In the United Kingdom,
though, the sustained revival of the Liberal Party since 1970, the rise of nationalist parties
in Wales and Scotland, and the new Social Democratic Party, poised signicant challenges
to the established two{party system. The rising importance of these new or resurgent
parties in British politics actually seemed to work to the advantage of the Conservatives
in the early 1980's as Conservative opposition was split among several parties. This led
to explicit attempts by political leaders, by the popular press, and by political pundits
to persuade voters to cast strategic votes in order to defeat the Conservative party in the
1987 general election (Galbraith and Rae 1989). Thus, the 1987 British general election
has become an important case study for scholars interested in the problem of strategic
voting in multiparty elections.
In these two types of political settings | multiparty elections in Britain and presiden-
tial primaries in the United States | many scholars have tried to estimate the amount
of strategic behavior by voters. As we report in Table 1, there is a great deal of variation
in the estimates of strategic behavior reported in the literature, ranging from a low of
5.1% reported by Johnston and Pattie (1991) for the 1983 British elections to a high of
17% reported by Niemi et al. (1992) for the 1987 British election. The estimates in the
literature for the 1988 U.S. presidential primary are in the vicinity of 14%.
Table 1 goes here
In this paper we develop a new approach for modeling strategic voting: we incorporate
the variance in the likelihood of strategic voting across constituencies in a model of voter
choice. This builds upon recent empirical work on modeling voter choice in multiparty
democratic systems (Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 1995). As we argue below, our approach
avoids many of the problems bedeviling past empirical work on strategic voting. In the
end, using our new approach we estimate that 7.2% of the electorate cast strategic ballots
in the 1987 British election; this estimate is less than half of some of the methodologically{
troubled estimates which have been published in the literature. The structure of our
paper is simple. We begin by examining the previous attempts to measure strategic
voting. Next, we outline our model of strategic voting, and carefully distinguish between
our approach the those in the existing literature. We then discuss our results, and
conclude with a brief discussion focusing on the relevance of our work.
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2 Strategic Voting and Past Studies
While there now seem to be political conditions in both the United States in the United
Kingdom which give voters an incentive to behave strategically, the empirical literature
has come up with very dierent estimates of the extent of strategic voting, even from
researchers examining the same election in the same country. We believe that the reason
for these divergent results lies in the dierent methodologies used in these studies to
measure or to estimate the extent of strategic voting.
There have been three dierent approaches to measuring the extent of strategic voting
used in the literature. The rst is the aggregated inference methodology. Essentially
these researchers use aggregate election returns, in dierent ways, to discern the extent
of strategic voting. Some researchers use aggregate electoral data to attempt a direct
constituency{by{constituency estimate of strategic voting (Cain 1978), while others look
at shifts in vote shares between pairs of elections in dierent types of constituencies
(Spaord 1972; Curtice and Steed 1988; Galbraith and Rae 1989; Johnston and Pattie
1991). Others have simply examined the support for minority parties in dierent political
systems (plurality versus proportional representation systems) to infer the presence of
strategic voting.
These studies all suer from an obvious and problematic aw. They all are using ag-
gregated electoral data to infer individual{level preferences and expectations about the
probabilities of various parties winning elections. In broader terms, these researchers are
testing individual{level political theories with macro{level electoral data | producing
exactly the \ecological inference" problem which has received much attention in the writ-
ing of prominent political methodologists in recent years (e.g. Achen and Shively 1995;
King 1997). It is commonly known that estimates about individual behavior produced
using aggregated data are often incorrect (King 1997). Thus, we must be very suspicious
of estimates of an individual{level behavior like strategic voting produced using aggregate
electoral data.
The second approach to measuring the extent of strategic voting is what we call the
self{reporting intentions methodology. In this widely{used approach, researchers
rely upon the reports of survey respondents about the motivations for their voting be-
havior (Heath et al. 1991; Niemi et al. 1992; Evans and Heath 1993). For example,
in the 1987 British general election survey, respondents were asked to provide the main
reason for supporting a particular party at the polls | one of the three response options
often used to indicate strategic behavior was \I really preferred another Party but it had
no chance of winning in this constituency."
This type of survey question, in particular those in the 1987 British survey data, have
been used quite widely in the literature on strategic voting. In fact, Niemi et al. (1992)
use this survey question, and a subsequent open{ended question asking for the reasons a
respondent cast the ballot they reported, to develop three dierent measures of strategic
voting. Unfortunately researchers using these survey questions do not appear to have
seriously considered the quality of the survey responses obtained for questions asking
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for justications of reported political behavior. In fact, there has been a serious debate
in the American electoral behavior literature recently about the quality of post{election
questions probing the respondent's vote (Wright 1990, 1992); this work has found that
there is a strong bias towards reporting a vote for winning candidates the further the
interview is from the election.
In Figure 1 we present percentages of self{reported strategic voters in each month
following the election in which the interview was conducted in 1987 for the the three
Neimi et al. (1992) measures of self{reported strategic voting. The bottom line in
the gure gives the percentages of reported strategic voters in each of the postelection
interview months as estimated by the closed{ended survey responses (indicated in the
gure by triangles), the next line gives the same percentages but estimated from the
open{ended responses (indicated in the gure by squares), while the top line gives the
combined percentages from both sets of survey responses (indicated in the gure by
diamonds).
[Figure 1 Goes Here]
It is quite clear that there is a postelection bias in favor of nding increased levels
of strategic voting the further the interview is conducted from election day. This ef-
fect is particularly strong in the open{ended method of measurement, since we see clear
increases in each successive postelection month in the reported percentage of strategic
voting. Of those respondents who were interviewed six months following the 1987 elec-
tion, the open{ended approach of survey{based measurement of strategic voting would
assert that they were over twice as likely as respondents interviewed one month after the
election to report strategic voting. This strong positive bias in the extent of reported
strategic voting using the open{ended survey measurement approach also clearly biases
the \combined" measures (which use information from both the open{ and closed{ended
measures of strategic voting). We even nd that there is a small positive bias in esti-
mated strategic behavior the further the interview was conducted from the election when
we look at the closed{ended measure.
The percentages and the positive slopes of the three lines in Figure 1 demonstrate
that relying on the self{reports of respondents to measure the incidence of strategic
voting is problematic, and is likely to produce overstated estimates of the proportions
of the electorate who are voting strategically. For many of these self{reports are not
really strategic voting, but misreporting of vote biased towards the winner|which is
observationally equivalent to reporting a strategic vote. Thus we believe that these
artifacts of the survey design (that the survey was conducted for such a long period
after election day and that the quality of the answers to these questions about strategic
behavior deteriorate following the election) provide strong evidence against the use of
these survey questions for the measurement of strategic behavior.
The third approach to measuring the extent of strategic voting in the literature is
the closest to the theoretical models of strategic behavior in multiparty democracy. This
approach tries to model strategic voting directly as the objective dierences between the
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stated vote and the preference rankings of individuals (Black 1978; Cain 1978) or the
subjective dierences between the vote cast and a rank{ordering of parties or candidates
(Abramson et al. 1992; Bartels 1988; Blais and Nadeau 1996; Brady and Johnson 1987).
This approach involves obtaining measures of the expected vote shares of each party or
candidate and the true rank{orderings of parties or candidates for each voter, so we call
this the direct measurement methodology.
We believe that this approach is the one most likely to produce unbiased estimates
of the extent of strategic voting in multiparty democracies. However, we are not con-
vinced that the literature has yet advanced an appropriate way to measure the true
rank{orderings for parties or candidates for voters. The usual approach in the literature
is to rely upon feeling thermometer rankings to produce rank{orderings of parties or can-
didates for voters. The implicit assumption here is that responses to feeling thermometer
questions elicit sincere preferences, an assumption which seems dubious at best.
1
We
nd that there is no reason to believe that feeling thermometer questions are adequate
measures of sincere preferences; no strong justication for this assumption has appeared
in the literature. So we advance a dierent approach for studying the extent of strategic
voting in the next section of this paper.
3 A New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting
Our new approach for modeling strategic voting follows the general approach of the third
aspect of the literature we just discussed, but with two important innovations. First, we
begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems
than has been presented in the literature to date. We use a methodological technique
(multinomial probit) which allows us to examine the full choice set available to voters
while explicitly allowing voters to see some parties as close substitutes (thus avoiding
imposing the restrictive \independence of irrelevant alternatives" assumption on voters
in this application). Second, we use a new operationalization of the objective strategic
setting. We take advantage of the electoral structure of British elections that allows for
cross{constituency variance in the likelihood of strategic voting. In this section of the
paper we discuss both these innovations and then conclude by discussing the specic
expectations we have of our model's predictions.
Our model of sincere voting is based heavily upon recent work on modeling multi-
party elections using individual{level survey data (Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 1995; Al-
varez, Bowler and Nagler 1997). There are two important dimensions of this work which
are relevant for our study of strategic voting. The rst dimension is that this approach
utilizes a well{specied model of voter decisionmaking. The data we are analyzing comes
from the 1987 British General Election and we oer a model of voter decisionmaking
which allows for retrospective economic, issue{based prospective, and class{based voting
behavior (Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler 1997). Thus our model of sincere voting provides
a vehicle for us to control for all of the important perspectives on British electoral be-
havior simultaneously; this allows us to test for strategic voting without worrying about
5
competing eects.
We view the voters' utility for each party to be a function of the voter's position
on the issues relative to the party and of characteristics of the voter which we describe
below. The inclusion of issue variables in our models stems from the growing realization
that \issues matter" in British elections, just as they \matter" in the electoral politics
of many industrial democracies (Inglehart 1977). This stems also from the realization
that the eect of class in British elections has slipped considerably (Crewe 1974; Crewe,
Sarlvik and Alt 1977; Sarlvik and Crewe 1983). Working from the framework of the
spatial model of elections, we include variables for the distance between the voter and
each party on defense, government emphasis on ination versus unemployment, taxes,
redistribution of income, nationalization of industry, crime, and social welfare programs.
The parties' position on each issue is taken to be the mean of the party placement on
the 11 point issue scale by all respondents. We use the absolute value of the dierence
between respondents' position and the party's position as a measure of issue distance on
each item.
2
Hand in hand with the realization that issues are replacing class in framing voter
decisions in British elections is a growing realization of the eects of voter perceptions
of the economy. This has occupied much of the empirical work on British elections (Alt
1979; Lewis{Beck 1988; Studlar, McAllister and Ascui 1990). Accordingly, we include
in our models variables for the respondent's perceptions of recent changes in ination,
unemployment, and taxation levels (McAllister and Studlar 1992). This allows a test of
the retrospective voting model in a three party setting.
We also include demographic measures of the respondents. To allow for the possibility
that class did matter in the 1987 election, we also include a number of control variables.
First, we have an indicator of the voters' class aliation: whether the voter occupied a
blue{collar occupation or not.
3
Union membership has long been considered a staple of
Labour support, but it is possible that this source of support has diminished consider-
ably with the dismantling of the trade union movement during the rst two Thatcher
administrations. We include a dummy variable for trade union members to examine the
eect of union membership on voter choice. As a third control for the eects of class,
we have a dummy variable which measures whether or not the voter was a public sector
employee.
4
Demographic variables other than class have loomed large in research on British
elections. The regional divisions in recent British elections have spurred a urry of
works on regional inuences on voting, even though the growing North{South political
cleavage in British voting may be more of an artifact of economic divisions than anything
specic to certain regions (Crewe 1992; McAllister and Studlar 1992). We include regional
dummy variables in our models to test these assertions. With the massive sales of council
houses during the Thatcher years, no doubt motivated to appeal to the moderately well{
o working classes, it is asserted that home ownership played some role in Thatcher's
success in 1987 (Crewe 1992). Accordingly, we have a dummy variable in the model for
6
home ownership. We also include measures of the respondent's age, sex, income, and
education.
Importantly, our approach to studying multiparty electoral behavior is fundamentally
dierent from the previous studies. Here, we begin with a random utility framework for
studying voter behavior in multiparty elections which allows us to examine the full choice
set of parties available to voters in any particular election. Any model of voter choice
should allow voters to consider simultaneously all three parties. It should allow voters
to weigh the parties' positions on the issues, to consider the parties' performance on
the economy, and it should allow voters of dierent demographic traits to have dierent
preferences for dierent parties. So, our framework does not impose the restrictive inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. We estimate the model using multinomial
probit.
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We follow the Alvarez{Nagler (Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1998) implementation of
multinomial probit which assumes that the respondent's utility is a function of choice{
specic and individual{specic characteristics:
U
ij
= A
i
 
j
+ X
ij
 + 
ij
(1)
where:
U
ij
= utility of the i
th
voter for the j
th
party
A
i
= characteristics of the i
th
voter
X
ij
= characteristics of the j
th
party relative to the i
th
voter
 
j
= a vector of parameters relating the characteristics of a voter to the voter's utility
for the j
th
party
 = a vector of parameters relating the relationship between the voter and the party
(X
ij
) to the voter's utility for the party

ij
= random disturbance for the i
th
voter for the j
th
party
prospective issue), and two sets of  's. One set of  's examines the relative eect of each
voter attribute on the likelihood of the voter choosing Conservative over Alliance, the
second set of  's examines the relative eect of each voter attribute on the likelihood of
the voter choosing Labour over Alliance.
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In particular, the multinomial probit technique is well{suited for the study of recent
British elections. Since 1945, there have been three viable national parties in British
politics, but it was not until the dual elections of 1974 that the Liberal party, in this
period the electorally weakest party, began obtaining roughly 20% of the national vote.
And in 1983, with the Liberal/Social Democratic Alliance (Alliance) obtaining 25.4% of
the national vote, just two percent lower than the Labour party, it looked as if British
voters may have nally had a \real" third alternative. Thus, the emergence of the Alliance
as an option oered British voters in 1983 and 1987 three choices.
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Yet British voters presumably do not view these three choices as truly distinct al-
ternatives. Common wisdom holds that the Alliance is a substitute for Labour, or at
least closer to Labour than to the Conservative party. However, even with this common
wisdom, few empirical papers consider the possibility of the grouping of choices nor the
possible violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (for exam-
ple, see McAllister and Studlar (1992) or Stewart and Clarke (1992) on the 1987 British
election). The multinomial probit model we use is useful precisely because it allows us
to both test for the violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption,
and if independence of irrelevant alternatives is violated, the model will also provide us
insight into the structure of the choice process. Is the Alliance considered by voters as a
substitute for Labour? Is the Alliance seen by voters as a choice more similar to Labour
than to the Conservative party? What would happen if the Alliance dissolved? The
multinomial probit model allows us to answer precisely these questions.
7
The multinomial probit model we use, then, provides the best model of strategic
voting which we can operationalize, specify and estimate. The next step in our analysis
of strategic voting in the 1987 British General Election involves operationalization of the
strategic situation facing individual voters in their own constituencies. The operative
hypothesis is that people vote strategically: that they cast a vote for candidates or
parties they think `can win', rather than `waste' their vote. Fortunately, British elections
provide a fertile ground to test the theory; since voters participate in single{member
constituencies, we have signicant variance across constituencies as to the likelihood of
a vote for a given party being wasted. We are able to examine the behavior of voters
who ought to have similar preferences for a given party being elected (assuming those
preferences are based on the attributes of individuals we measure), but we are able to
observe those voters in two dierent sorts of constituencies: constituencies where Labour
has a chance of winning the constituencies and constituencies where Labour has no chance
of winning. In these latter sorts of constituencies voters preferring Labour might want
to consider voting strategically. This structure of the electoral system allows for a test
of the strategic voting hypothesis.
We want to allow voters to cast their vote in a way likely to maximize the utility of
their vote; which may not necessarily mean voting for the candidate they would most
like to see win. Consider a voter whose rst choice is Labour (L) and who's complete
preference ordering is: L > A > C. If this voter were to behave strategically, then the
voter would be unlikely to vote for his/her rst choice (L) if: Labour were sure to lose
the constituency, and the voter's vote could help A to defeat C. In such a constituency,
a vote for Labour would be `wasted.'
We could write the i
th
voter's utility of casting a vote for Labour as:
U
iL
=  
L
A
i
+ X
iL
+ ,W
iL
(2)
where W
iL
is a measure of the characteristics of the i
th
voter's constituency associated
with a vote for Labour being `wasted', and  , , A, and X are dened as in equation (3)
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above. So we want W
iL
to encompass measures relating the probability of the vote for
Labour being wasted. What are the characteristics of a constituency where it would be
pointless to vote for Labour?
First, Labour would have to be too far behind in the race to have any reasonable
chance of winning. Second, the race between the Conservatives and Alliance would have
to be close. If both Labour and Alliance were going to be trounced by the Conservatives,
and provided the voter was going to vote at all, then there would be no benet to casting
a strategic vote for Alliance rather than a sincere vote for Labour.
We can measure both of these concepts. The rst is given by:
M1
iL
= jMax(CON;ALL)   LABOURj (3)
where CON , ALL, and LABOUR denote the expected vote shares of the Conservative,
Alliance, and Labour parties, respectively; and Max(CON;ALL) denotes the maximum
of CON and ALL (i.e., the party running second).
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This gives the amount that Labour
is `out of it'. We expect that the larger the value of M1
L
, the more likely that a vote for
Labour would be wasted, and the less likely a voter is to cast such a vote.
The second concept is given by:
M2
iL
= 1=j(CON   ALL)j (4)
The closer the race between Conservative and Alliance, the larger the value ofM2
iL
. And
the larger the value ofM2
iL
, the costlier it would be to waste a vote by voting for Labour,
and the more likely that the voter should act strategically and vote either Conservative
or Alliance. However, note that the impact of this variable ought to be contingent upon
the value of M1
iL
. For instance, in a three{way tie the value of M2
iL
would approach
innity; yet there would be zero reason to vote strategically because a vote for Labour is
called for. Hence M2
iL
should enter the model multiplied by M1
iL
. We include M2
iL
by
itself, as well as multiplied by M1
iL
, so that we can correctly interpret the coecients.
We construct similar measures for the Alliance and the Conservative party.
Thus, our approach to modeling strategic voting in the 1987 British General Election
is relatively simple. We add our two measures of the potential for strategic behavior for
each party, in each constituency, and estimate these parameters for each party controlling
for all of the other potential inuences on voter decisionmaking. Thus, for each party,
we estimate:
U
iL
= X
iL
+  
iL
A
i
+ 
1
M1
iL
+ 
2
M2
iL
+ 
3
 (M1
iL
M2
iL
) (5)
U
C
= X
C
+  
iL
A
i
+ 
1
M1
iC
+ 
2
M2
iC
+ 
3
 (M1
iC
M2
iC
) (6)
U
A
= X
A
+  
iL
A
i
+ 
1
M1
iA
+ 
2
M2
iA
+ 
3
 (M1
iA
M2
iA
) (7)
where L, C, A index Labour, Conservative and Alliance, respectively. X
iJ
measures issue
distances between the party and voter, A measure attitudes and characteristics specic to
the voter. Of critical interest for the purposes of this paper, though, are the coecients
on the strategic voting terms. By the logic of the operationalization of these measures
we expect that if strategic voting occurs, then: 
1
< 0, 
2
< 0, and 
3
< 0.
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4 Empirical Evidence for Strategic Voting in the 1987
British Election
In Table 1 we present the full multinomial probit results from the estimation of this
model. The results we obtain here are very similar to those presented in previous work
on this same election, so we will refer interested readers to that research (Alvarez, Bowler
and Nagler 1997). All we wish to note here is that most of the variables are signed
in theoretically{expected manners, many are statistically signicant, and this model
correctly classies 71% of the reported votes cast by the 2080 voters in our sample.
[Table 1 Goes Here]
The important coecients to focus on for our purposes are those on the three strategic
voting variables. In the previous section we had argued that we expected each of these
three coecients to be negatively signed. We nd that two of the three coecients (those
on M1 and the M1 M2 interaction) are negative and statistically signicant, although
the interaction term is signicant at the looser p = :10 level. The M2 coecient, though,
is positive and is also signicant at the p = :10 level.
The marginal eects of each of the objective strategic voting variables are:
@U
j
@M1
ij
=  :80  :40 M2
ij
(8)
@U
j
@M2
ij
= +:05  :40 M1
ij
(9)
Thus, the partial eects ofM1 are always negative, as predicted by our earlier discus-
sion (this is true since M2 is always positive). The further behind Labour is expected to
run in a constituency, the less likely a voter is to cast a vote for Labour. This is strategic
voting. However, the partial eects of M2 are negative only when M1 > :125 (i.e., only
when the third party is suciently far behind). This applies to 46% of constituencies
for the Labour party, 46% of constituencies for the Alliance, and 7% of constituencies
for the Conservative party. In our sample of respondents, how close the top two parties
are expected to be in the constituency aects the respondents' probability of voting for
Labour and Alliance in the predicted manner in 46% and 43% of cases, respectively. In
the other cases, given how competitive Labour and Alliance are in the constituency|the
closeness of the other two parties does not persuade the respondent to abandon Labour
or Alliance and vote strategically for one of the other two parties. For only 7% of our
respondents is the Conservative party expected to be so far behind the other two parties
that the closeness of the other two parties prompts a strategic vote by a Conservative
supporter.
However, what of the important substantive question | what is the estimated extent
of strategic voting in this particular election? Was it as high as the 17% reported by
Niemi and associates (1992) or was as low as the 6% reported by others (Evans and Heath
1993; Johnston and Pattie 1991)? Obviously, dramatic dierences like these in estimates
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of the extent of strategic voting lead to dierent interpretations of British politics, of
this specic model of strategic voter behavior, and even of the general rational choice
approach for studying politics.
We report our estimates of the extent of strategic voting in Table 2. There we
have classied each of the voters in our survey sample in two dierent ways. The rst
classication scheme is given by the rows of the table. To compute the row entries we used
the model reported in Table 1, but hypothesized that all voters were in constituencies
where the three parties had equal chances of winning (i.e., each party had a vote share of
33 1/3 % in the 1983 election in the constituency). We set variables M1 and M2 to zero,
and used the estimated coecients from Table 1 to compute the utility of each party for
each voter. We then assign the voter's choice to the party they have the highest utility;
this gives us each voter's sincere vote. Then, using the full model presented above,
including the strategic voting variables, we predict each voter's strategic votes for the
parties; these are presented in the columns of Table 2.
[Table 2 Goes Here]
The entries along the main diagonal of the table give the numbers and percentages
of voters in our sample whose predicted sincere and strategic votes are the same. The
o{diagonal voters are those who are strategic voters, since we predict that these voters
change from their sincere vote due to the objective probabilities of each party's victory in
the constituency. Adding the o-diagonal elements in Table 2, we see that there are 149
strategic voters in our sample, or 7.2% of the electorate. This number is in line with some
of the estimates oered in the literature (Evans and Heath 1993; Johnston and Pattie
1991). But our estimate suggests that those who have used subjective recall questions
to estimate strategic voting (e.g. Niemi et al. 1992) appear to have dramatically over{
estimated the proportions of strategic voters, possibly due to the over{reporting problem
we discussed earlier.
Table 2 reveals how those 149 strategic votes were distributed. Under sincere voting,
we predict a 33.5% vote-share for Labour. However, we estimate 54 (7.8%) of those voters
to have voted strategically for Alliance, and 3 of them to have voted strategically for the
Conservative party. But Alliance is the biggest victim of strategic voting. We predict
Alliance would have gotten an 18.7% share of the vote under sincere voting. However,
with strategic voting we estimate a 17.6% share. Of those we expect to defect strategically
from Alliance, we estimate that they split almost evenly between the Conservative and
Labour parties (10.5% and 10.8%, respectively). The Conservative party is the overall
beneciary of strategic voting: their estimated sincere vote share is 47.8%; while their
estimated strategic share is 49.5%.
These results match the intuition of the `wasted vote.' If voters do not want to
waste their vote on a party with a poor chance of winning the contested seat, then the
parties with the lowest expectations of winning a seat will be hurt. Also, the `wasted
vote' phenomenon in the 1987 British election harmed the party the least likely to win a
signicant share of constituencies | the Alliance. Therefore the net impact of strategic
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behavior in this election was for the Conservatives to pick up almost two full percentage
points of national vote share; both Labour and Alliance lose vote share as a result of
strategic behavior, with Alliance losing the most.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
We have made three important arguments in this paper. First, we have argued that
past approaches for the measurement of strategic voting have largely been awed. From
analyses that use ecological inference to those using self{reporting of strategic behavior,
we have argued that these approaches are likely to produce incorrect measures of the
likelihood of strategic behavior. In particular, using reported strategic voting to measure
strategic voting is a dangerous proposition because such self{reports are contaminated by
a tendency to overreport voting for the winner, a tendency exacerbated by self{reports
collected further away from the election. Since self{reports for the winner when the
voter's preference may have been for another candidate are observationally equivalent to
strategic voting, measurement using such self{reports will overstate the degree of strategic
voting. We think Figure 1 demonstrates the problem quite clearly.
Second, it is possible to take advantage of the electoral structure of British politics
to test for strategic voting. The British case oers variance across constituencies in
the expected amount of strategic voting. By utilizing this information, a well specied
model of voter preferences, and a exible estimation technique (multinomial probit), we
can better measure the extent of strategic voting. We believe that the combination of an
objective measure of the likelihood of strategic voting and our multinomial probit model
of voter choice is the best approach for modeling strategic voting behavior in multiparty
democracies.
Last, using our new approach, we nd the amount of strategic voting in the 1987
British General Election is on the low end of the range of previously reported estimates;
with some previous estimates being inated by at least a factor of two. There has been
considerable variation in the estimated extent of strategic voting in this particular elec-
tion, with estimates ranging from roughly 6-7% (Evans and Heath [1993]; Heath et al.
[1991]; Johnston and Pattie [1991]), to a slightly higher range of 10-12% (Galbraith and
Rae 1989), to as high as 17% (Niemi et al. 1993). Our estimate is an important sub-
stantive nding, since it veries that some strategic behavior occurred in this particular
British election | but only a slight amount of strategic behavior.
This leaves open the question of whether voters generally do or do not behave as
strategic models of politics predict. Our results here indicate that a small subset of the
electorate did behave strategically in this one election. The truth is out there; but to
determine if such strategic behavior is a general phenomenon, we will have to examine
other British elections and elections in other democratic multiparty nations. Only then
well we be in a position to know how much strategic behavior occurs in multiparty
12
elections, and what institutional features of dierent political systems play a role in
either mitigating or enhancing the likelihood that voters behave strategically.
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Notes
1
This assumption seems to run counter to one of the most common uses for feel-
ing thermometers in the electoral studies literature | a measure of party or candidate
preferences, and ultimately, voting behavior (e.g., Kelley and Mirer 1974). Feeling ther-
mometers, especially those for political parties, have also been used to measure partisan
aliation, which also seems quite at odds with the use of these survey questions as mea-
sures of sincere voting preferences if partisanship is conceptually distinct from voting
behavior (e.g., Alvarez 1990; Weisberg 1980). Given that researchers uses these survey
questions to measure such diverse concepts clearly calls into question what feeling ther-
mometer questions really measure. This is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, but
it does lead us to be wary of analyses of strategic voting based on feeling thermometers.
2
By using the distance from the respondents' self{placement to the mean placement of
each party|rather than the distance from the respondents' self{placement to the respon-
dents' placement of the party|we avoid contaminating our measure with the tendency
of respondents to project their favored candidates closer to their own ideal issue position.
3
Categories one through six of the occupation variable (as well as military) were coded
as blue{collar; see Heath (1989) for a full listing of the occupation codes.
4
We have examined alternative operationalizations for the role of class in this election.
In particular, we used the Heath{Goldthorpe categorization of individuals into occupation
groups (Salariat, Routine nonmanual, Petty bourgeoisie, Foremen and technicians, and
working class [Heath et al. 1985]). This alternative specication of class did not add
explanatory power to our model, and we do not present those results here. They are
available from the authors.
5
See our previous work for a systematic discussion of the multinomial probit model
(Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1998).
6
We also estimate three error correlations. In this analysis the disturbances are as-
sumed to be multivariate normal, with mean zero and covariance matrix . The o{
diagonal elements of  give the correlations between pairs of disturbances, assuming
that variance of each disturbance is one.
7
These models can also give insight into the dynamics of the possible groupings of
choices by British voters. It is quite possible that as party fortunes change, as their
positions and general ideologies change, or as they go in and out of control of Parliament,
that the similarities voters see between the parties may change as well.
8
We use each party's vote share in from the 1983 election in each constituency as
the expected vote share. This has the benet of being widely available to voters before
election day in 1987; the previous vote share in each constituency should be the basis
from which voters form their expectations about each party's chances in 1987.
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Table 1: Published estimates of strategic voting
Study Election Estimate of strategic voting
Johnston and Pattie (1991) 1983 UK 5.1%
Lanoue and Bowler (1992) 1983 UK 5.8%
Blais and Nadeau (1996) 1988 Canada 6.0%
Evans and Heath (1993) 1987 UK 6.3%
Heath et al. (1991) 1987 UK 6.5%
Lanoue and Bowler (1992) 1987 UK 6.6%
Johnston and Pattie (1991) 1987 UK 7.7%
Heath and Evans (1994) 1992 UK 9.0%
Galbraith and Rae (1989) 1987 UK 10-12%
Abramson et al. (1992) 1988 US S.T. Dem. 13%
Abramson et al. (1992) 1988 US S.T. Rep. 12.7-13.9%
Cain (1978) 1970 UK 14.6%
Niemi et al. (1993) 1987 UK 17.0%
Table 2: Multinomial Probit Estimates, 1987 Election
Independent Variables Conservatives / Alliance Labour / Alliance
Defense -.14*
(.01)
Unemployment/Ination -.09*
(.02)
Taxation -.13*
(.02)
Nationalization -.14*
(.01)
Redistribution -.07*
(.01)
Crime -.08*
(.04)
Welfare -.10*
(.01)
M1 (First Choice Hopeless) -.80*
(.19)
M2 (1, 2 Close) .05**
(.03)
M1*M2 (Interaction) -.40**
(.24)
Constant .10 1.49*
(.54) (.52)
South -.03 -.07
(.11) (.13)
Midlands -.20* -.05
(.09) (.13)
North -.09 .35*
(.11) (.13)
Wales -.29 .98*
(.30) (.20)
Scotland -.28** .52*
(.15) (.16)
Union Member -.45* .22*
(.08) (.07)
Public Sector Employee .10** .01
(.06) (.09)
Blue Collar .05 .52*
(.10) (.10)
Female .26* -.03
(.10) (.09)
Age .04 -.14*
(.04) (.03)
Home Ownership .39* -.32*
(.10) (.09)
Family Income .06* -.04*
(.02) (.02)
Education -.60** -.34
(.22) (.23)
Ination .24* -.02
(.08) (.07)
Unemployment .23* .01
(.04) (.05)
Taxes .02 -.08**
(.05) (.04)

LA
.32*
(.09)

CL
-.30*
(.10)
Number of Obs 2131
LL -1418.0
Standard Errors in parenthesis.

indicates signicance at 95% level;

indicates signicance at
90% level.
Table 3: Predicted Strategic and Sincere Votes
Predicted Sincere Votes
Strategic
Conservative Labour Alliance Totals
Predicted Conservative 986 3 41 1030
Strategic (99.1) (.4) (10.5) (49.5)
Votes Labour 2 639 42 683
(.2) (91.8) (10.8) (32.8)
Alliance 7 54 306 367
(.7) (7.8) (78.7) (17.6)
Sincere Totals 995 696 389 2080
(47.8) (33.5) (18.7) (100.0)
Note: Entries are numbers of respondents, followed by column percentages in
parentheses. Each o-diagonal cell represents strategic voting. Marginals at
the end of each row give predicted votes with strategic voting. Marginals at
the bottom of each column give predicted votes with only sincere voting.
Figure 1: Increases in Reported Strategic Voting Following the 1987 Election
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